



## **A History of U.S.S.R. Encroachment of Afghanistan and the Developments in U.S. Foreign Policy**

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**Abstract.** The study of “A History of U.S.S.R Encroachment on Afghanistan and the Developments in U.S Foreign Policy” will examine the significant point towards Afghan internal situation, particularly towards the Afghanistan’s political situation, Soviet initial reluctant policies towards Afghanistan and eventually rapid changes in U.S.S.R policy in the form of encroachment on Afghanistan. Furthermore, this imperative study will evaluate the U.S foreign policy towards Soviet encroachment on Afghanistan, revenge to Soviet Union on Vietnam War, use of CIA for aiding to Afghan insurgents and the key role of U.S decision makers. Finally, we will discuss the U.S winning points of this US-Soviet Cold War. This study has been distributed in three main parts, first part of study will discuss about the Afghanistan’s internal and political situation, second part of study will evaluate the Soviet’s initial reluctant policies towards Afghanistan and further discussion about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. U.S interests towards Central Asia, U.S foreign policy towards U.S.S.R encroachment of Afghanistan and critical steps in U.S foreign policy will be discussed in the third part of this study and furthermore, in the third part, we will discuss about the Brazanki’s interview in which he accepted the U.S hidden role in Cold War and supporting Afghanistan’s insurgents against the U.S.S.R.

**Keywords:** Afghan’s Situation; U.S.S.R Policy; Encroachment; U.S Foreign Policy; Insurgents.

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### **Afghanistan in Historical Context**

Afghan territory is a landlocked at about 250,000 square miles, which is situated near the Iran upland, subcontinent of India and Central Asia. The borders of Afghanistan also touch with Iran in west, Pakistan in southeast, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan in north and China in east side (Younossi & Nadiri, 2008). The total area of Afghanistan is 647497 square kilometers but it is a little smaller than Pakistan (Jalalzai, 1999; 16). The shape of Afghanistan is same as fry pan. This slightness of the Afghanistan recognized as Wakhan corridor which was sculpted by Britain administration to stop the U.S.S.R for involvement towards Indian subcontinent.

The contemporary Afghanistan's kingdom was established in 1747 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2007). During 1893, the boundaries between Britain administration and U.S.S.R were demarcated and an agreement on Oxus River was signed between both powers, in which they accepted that the said river is in North region of Afghanistan (Qaeem, 2008). Afghan territory is situated at tri-junction of almost four tactical states and also famous as region of cross roads and this region is known as trade route between South, West and Central Asia from various centuries. Pakistan explicitly deals with whatsoever power existed on land to ease the improvements and advancements of trading with Central region of Asia (Rubin, 1995). The slump of U.S.S.R and oil sources of Central Asia considerably changed the geopolitical environment of the region. Therefore, the Afghan region gets the illustrative importance as land bridge for trade route, gas and oil trading. In the current era, Central Asian countries have known as golden routes for energy savings and Afghanistan is a prime hub for this purpose.

### **Afghanistan's Political Environment**

Although Afghanistan has a key position in Central Asia and this region also has a complex level decentralization disability so various external actor's invaded and interfere in the region. Afghanistan is also known as graveyard of empires. Almost three decades of war in this region, it has showed the intricate tangle of linguistic, religious, tribal, ethnicity and also threat for national and global levels.

Furthermore, during 1970s, Afghanistan suffered from the revolution of socialization and in 1978, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PADA) controlled the state as social state and Nur Muhammad Taraki was the first President of Afghanistan, which was backed by U.S.S.R. However, the women rights and land reforms of PADA administration were rejected by the Afghan nation, military and also by the various members of their party (Grau& Gress, 2002).

Eventually, Taraki's government fails in managing and controlling the territory. Various tribes began to create disturbance in the country, for instance, Hazara tribes were Shia and backed by Iran. They don't accept the PADA reforms, and other non-Pushtuns were also against the government (Gupta,1986). Due to these troubles, during 1979, Afghan government request to his neighboring country Soviet Union for their help. Although the Afghanistan's internal political, economical and social situation was destabilized so initially Soviet's administration was reluctant to deploy their forces in the Afghan region.

#### **Soviet Initial Reluctant Policy and Eventual Encroachment on Afghanistan**

In the various studies, it has been pointed out that U.S.S.R already decided and has hidden objective during Soviet-Afghan war, so U.S.S.R administration viewed the encroachment on Afghan region. But this imperative study showed the new aspect of U.S.S.R encroachment on Afghanistan.

Actually, U.S.S.R administration and politburo initially were disagreeing on Afghanistan's encroachment. But this disinclination was dramatically changed in 1979 during the revolts of Heart (Afghanistan) region, which provoked the disaster and various crises for U.S.S.R administration. In the dangerous and unstable situation, Government of Afghanistan requested to U.S.S.R for their help in this critical situation but initially Politburo refuse to interfere in Afghanistan. Finally, U.S.S.R administration met to judge the difficult decision of Afghanistan's encroachment to safe their power in Afghanistan. The content of this transcript is so attractive and interesting. We can also judge through following discussion of U.S.S.R officials that at initial stage U.S.S.R administration was not agreed:

*Yuri Andropov: Comrades, I have thought this issue over very thoroughly since yesterday and have concluded that we should consider very, very seriously whether it would make sense to send troops into Afghanistan. The economy is backward, the Islamic religion predominates, and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate. I do not think we can uphold the revolution in Afghanistan with the help of our bayonets. The idea is intolerable and we cannot risk it.*

*Andrei Gromyko: I fully support Comrade Andropov's view that we should exclude the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan. The Afghan army is unreliable and our army would become an aggressor. With whom will it fight? With the Afghan people! Our Army would have to shoot them! To be blunt, the Afghan [communist] leaders have made many mistakes and haven't got the support of their own people.*

*Andrei Kirilenko: Tanks and armored vehicles cannot rescue them [the PDPA]. I think that we must frankly tell them that. We must say that we will support them to the hilt, we shall give them all of the aid that we have promised to give, but we cannot send troops (Cordovez & Harrison, 1995).*

U.S.S.R initial unwilling policy towards encroachment of Afghanistan steadily changed, actually due to Afghanistan's internal political and physical situation. Particularly, the U.S.S.R feel doubts about Afghan government from their past experiences, which was observed as inattentive and impetuous. Furthermore, Politburo also assumed that Amin's administration has links with U.S administration. Opposite of U.S.S.R desires, PADA sustained to get the control during 1979, due to weaknesses in Taraki's government and as the revolution of 1979, Amin takeover the control from Taraki. This situation in Afghanistan was a big threat to U.S.S.R and their supremacy policies. Furthermore, U.S.S.R already feels the U.S interest towards Central Asia and feels prime threat to U.S.S.R

supremacy in the region so they decided to control the Afghanistan and don't want to see the U.S in this region.

### **Developments in U.S Foreign Policy**

It has been seen in history that after the British withdrawal from Asia, the U.S increased their interests towards this region and has manifold and at the same time contending objectives towards Central Asia. U.S consequence of his different layout and gigantic deposits of gas, coal, uranium, oil, this area, plays the prime element in U.S worldwide policy in vision of his propinquity towards U.S.S.R, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Iranian and various others major players. Furthermore, various scholars and historians also pointed out the lot of U.S interests towards the Central Asian region. So to get his hidden and supremacy objectives, U.S changed his foreign policy towards this region.

The Moscow's encroachment on Afghan region during 1979 is a major example of Russia's commencement and falls in the form of U.S hopes that the U.S.S.R desire to move towards southern area of Warm Water and Persian Gulf. The U.S.S.R encroachment of Afghanistan as explained by Michael Armacost (Secretary of State) that; "marked the primary Russian forces encroachment since WW-II". This was the prime case of Moscow's forces encroachment well outside the momentous and historic encroachment way from the Western. For these causes, U.S foreign policy towards Afghan region was certainly labeled respond and reactive.

U.S President Carter and his foreign policy towards Afghanistan during 1979 paved the path for almost ten years of U.S involvement in the U>S>S>R-Afghan war. As the political environment swiftly deteriorated in Afghan region during 1979 so U.S government and their policy makers began to consider U.S.S.R encroachment and their interests towards the Afghan region. Finally, Carter and his team took more attention to develop their comprehensive foreign policies and get their objectives and revenge to U.S.S.R on Vietnam War.

### **U.S Initial Policy Steps**

U.S policy makers, Cyrus Vance as State Secretary and Brzezinski as National Security Advisor (NSA), were both agreed on Moscow's encroachment of

Afghanistan and were on critical thinking about them that how to deal with Afghanistan's government, which was backed by Moscow (Brzezinski, 1983: 443-54). The foreign policy deliberations driven by the National Security Council (NSC) as well as State Department under both the policy makers rose to vanguard of discussion on how the America finds a best solution in critical situation of Afghan's region. Positive response to U.S administration leader, both were at superlative position to adjust the U.S foreign policy and have positive opinions on the way it must be getting once Taraki control the state.

Eventually, both the policy maker's opinions were different towards Afghan situation. NSA Brazanki want to significant support the rebellions and control the Afghan situation, on the other hand, Vance actually was waiting for. Ex-National Security Adviser did not want to wait more and was agreed on prompt action on part of the U.S. NSA Brazanki began to makes the plans for a significantly more hostile position through CIA to perform any imminent strategy towards Afghan region where as ex-State Secretary was satisfied to carry out the gesture of existing United State's assistance provided to current administration (Brzezinski, 1983: 443-54). Though, the National Security Advisor was alert to respond to the Moscow's moving and actually knew that an alteration of the State Security potential should happen for U.S to do so. During the U.S.S.R invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski evokes how, "it does not extensively identify that throughout Carter's era, the Central Intelligence Agency was controlled by National Security Council and Director of Security Agency had restricted approaches to President Carter office (Brzezinski, 1983: 443-54)." The level of NSA's control and all endeavors were provided to bring about the developments in security agencies are difficult to decide, but security agencies' newly discovered power was certainly used by the government to take away the impact of U.S strategies in Afghan region following the Moscow's encroachment (Coll, 2004).

To know the internal situation of Afghanistan, Carter's administration sent U.S official (David Newsom) to Afghanistan, on his returning, the Embassy report's to U.S administration about the internal political situation of Afghanistan and Vance

agreed to support the U.S.S.R oppositions and also it could cause negative collision on U.S.S.R support to Afghan government (Vance, 1983). But other higher authorities were not still agreed on these suggestions but after some time Vance resigned from his job, because he was agreed on aiding through security agencies to Moscow oppositions. Beside, powerful Brzezinski hold rather dissimilar views from his opponent on Soviet decision and present freely can put the strategy (Hilali, 2005). Finally, U.S decided to aid the Soviet opposition for getting their objectives.

After the decision of aiding to Afghan rebellions, CIA sends a memorandum to his administration during 1979 regarding the situation of Afghan region and informed that "Afghan rebellions are achieving the successes against the Afghan administration (Gates, 2007)." External actors were also interested in this U.S-U.S.S.R cold War, for instance, Pakistan, Saudia and various other countries and second memorandum was send to U.S Security Council and indicated that "Saudi Arabia is interested in Afghan region and wants to aid the Moscow's opposition and wants to encourage the Pakistani government for this purpose." The CIA deliberation of their state involvement in Afghanistan lead to memorandum further added, "Moscow can easily support and aid to Afghan government, though we hope Moscow may send their forces." Most considerably, Robert reminded about various regular memorandum towards Afghan situation and stressing the concepts that, "If Moscow decided to encroachment of Afghan territory so we can't stop them, but some movements can harsh them in the area (Gates, 2007)."

After this, a meeting was held towards Afghan internal situation, in which six options were given by security agency towards Afghanistan, and suggested the direct aiding to Afghan rebellions. And further discussed that how the CIA provided the more and more aiding to insurgents for opposing the Moscow forces and this financial support will be provided in different ways i.e. armaments, arrangements of trainings and others activities (Gates, 2007). At least, different kinds of support was recommended by U.S President (as per "Presidential Finding) for Afghan rebellions for opposing the Moscow forces and create various troubles for them (Gates, 2007). Furthermore, various other countries also played a key role in aiding

and supporting Mujahidin, for instance, Pakistan played a key role as bridge between CIA and Mujahedeen; Saudi government funneled the billions of dollars to Afghan insurgents (Rashid, 2001).

### **U.S Critical Decisions**

However the America's tenuous warnings and messages were overlooked by U.S.S.R administration. Therefore, for inceptive response to U.S.S.R on their Afghan encroachment and revenge of their act, was now the first priority of U.S administration. In the history, it has been seen that U.S policies makes during this Cold War' showed the implications not only on Afghanistan or U.S.S.R but the same were on the peoples of U.S, East and Southern region of Asia. After these critical decisions, an U.S official stated that "the U.S.S.R encroachment of Afghanistan was big threat to U.S and other linking states and the decisions made by U.S can provided a prime chance to good relationship between U.S and his allies" (Brzezinski, 1983: 443-54).

U.S administration views on Afghan situation pointed out the various spots which were so important towards the U.S reaction on U.S.S.R's encroachment of Afghanistan. After some time, U.S leader again speeches towards Afghan situation and stated that "current talk on 2<sup>nd</sup> nuclear agreement with U.S.S.R will be embraced until the U.S to understand the U.S.S.R's interests towards the Afghan region (Strategic Arms, 2001).

Another important decision was also made by U.S government during the U.S.S.R encroachment of Afghanistan. U.S administration decided the limitation on U.S-U.S.S.R business by claiming that U.S is going to decrease his exporting business with Soviet in three main regions due to their encroachment of Afghanistan. The main fields were technology, machinery, fishing and graining fields were also warned to Soviet. Furthermore, U.S announced to boycott to participate in Olympic Games, which were held in U.S.S.R until they withdraw their forces from Afghanistan (Carter, 1980).

U.S not only stop on boycotting of Olympic or decreasing of business but they further announced that, "Global reaction should be towards the internal



environment of Afghan region.” U.S President stated that “The U.S should reach its authority and leadership (Carter, 1980).” Finally, during the era of Olympic Games, U.S boycotts to participate in this important event (Brzezinski, 1983: 443-54). It was big decision and prime part of U.S foreign policy due to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and gets their own objectives.

### **Brzezinski’s Interview**

U.S foreign policy during U.S.S.R encroachment of Afghanistan was not only boycotting the games and decreasing of business or other activities but they began to funneled the billions of dollars to insurgent’s movements of Afghanistan and also makes the strong relations with neighboring countries of Afghanistan. As relating to provision of support to Afghan movements and secret war against the U.S.S.R, Brzezinski - he was the Director of CIA during the initial Soviet encroachment of Afghanistan- affirmed during an interview to French Le-Nouvel during 1990s. Brzezinski gave the significant and valuable information towards U.S foreign policy during Soviet-U.S Cold War and about secret operation by U.S during Afghan-U.S.S.R conflict; the translation of interview with little amendments makes by “Gibbs” is as under:

*Q: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs, that the American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahidin in Afghanistan six months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the national security adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a key role in this affair. Is this correct?*

*Answer by Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahidin began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to*

*him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.*

*Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked for a way to provoke it?*

*Answer by Brzezinski: It wasn't quite like that. We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.*

*Q: When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against secret U.S involvement in Afghanistan , nobody believed them. However, there was an element of truth in this. You don't regret any of this today?*

*Answer by Brzezinski: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: "We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war". Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war that was unsustainable for the regime, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.*

*Q: And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?*

*Answer by Brzezinski: What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?*

*(Gibbs, 2000: 233-45).25*

Brzezinski's discussions were very important and have depth towards funneling of billions of dollars to insurgents and U.S secret war. This interview gave the various points towards the U.S foreign policy during this Cold War. In this discussion we

can easily judge that Brzezinski accepted their backing to Afghan rebellions and making the policy to revenge the U.S.S.R on Vietnam War. At least this secret war and foreign policy during this Cold War win the war, in which U.S policy makers played the prime role.

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